We find that a nation's urban population percentage increases with GDP per capita; industrialization; export orientation; and possibly, foreign assistance. It decreases with the importance of agriculture. Industrialization and agricultural importance have the same implications for the concentration of urban population in cities with 100,000 q population as for the urban percentage. Greater export orientation reduces such concentration. Finally, GDP per capita, population, and export orientation reduce primacy. Political factors, such as whether a country's largest city is also its capital, affect primacy. Our results do not seem to imply that developing-country urbanization today differs fundamentally from urbanization in the past. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
Urbanization is closely linked to economic development. As economies develop, relative and absolute changes in demand increase the relative and absolute importance of the manufacturing and service sectors. These sectors are much less land intensive than the agricultural sector, and they allow easier substitution of nonland for land inputs. Thus, firms in these sectors can concentrate in urban areas in spite of urban land's high prices Ž w x w x w x Graves and Sexton 8 , Mills 11 , Mills and Becker 12 , and Mills and w x. Hamilton 13 . Internal economies of scale, economies of urbanization and localization, and positive transportation costs increase the urban Ž w x advantage for both production and consumption Graves and Sexton 8 w x. and Mills and Becker 12 . As markets grow, the division and specialization of labor increases. This places a premium on physical proximity to reduce transportation costs and often increases the importance of face-to-Ž w x w x. face contact to reduce communication costs Evans 7 and Stigler 20 . These ideas underlie formal models of urbanization, such as Brueckner's w x 4 Mills-type model. Brueckner's model determines a country's urban population or, more precisely, the population of the largest city in a country. Equilibrium requires that individuals be indifferent between urban and rural location, which usually requires higher income in the urban area because of urban land's higher price. This approach emphasizes he increasing productivity and therefore the increasing attractiveness of urban areas as economies develop; it considers the urbanization that accompanies development as natural and desirable.
Although they do not dispute this analysis for developed countries, w x w x economists such as Bairoch 2 and Todaro 21 do not think that urbanization in developing countries today is benign or in response to positive economic features of urban areas. Instead, they believe it is excessive. Bairoch, for instance, argues that urbanization in developing countries is much greater than their level of development would suggest; in short, he regards it as excessive. He argues that this ''excessive'' urbanization follows rapid population growth caused by, among other factors, declines in mortality rates; rapid population growth in turn leads to rural crowding and stimulates rural to urban migration. In addition, he argues that artificially high urban wages pull a disproportionate part of the population to urban areas. Bairoch invokes a duality between the productive modern urban sector, which uses modern technology, and the backward agricultural sector, which uses traditional technology, to partially explain artificially high urban wages. Todaro takes a similar position concerning wages; he differs in his greater emphasis on economically inefficient migration caused by legally and socially determined minimum wage rates, government subsidies of industrialization and urbanization, and a general bias toward the largest city. w x In a study that we build on, Mills and Becker 12 regress the percentage Ž . of a country's population in urban areas the percent urban on the percentage of the labor force in agriculture, GNP per capita, and other variables. As expected, they found a positive relationship between the percent urban and GNP per capita and a negative one between percent urban and the agricultural share. Because our focus is on the concentration of population in large cities, we estimate a similar percent-urban equation. Our intent, however, is to use it as a benchmark in examining urban concentration.
Ž w x. One survey Hamer and Lin 9 of the empirical urbanization literature Ž cites only two studies of the relationship between city size urban concen-. w x tration and economic development. Rosen and Resnick's study 18 uses the exponent calculated from a Pareto distribution of city sizes as a dependent variable; it finds that countries with smaller populations and with lower per capita incomes have more concentrated population centers. w x The other study, Henderson 10 , uses a Herfindahl index to measure urban concentration; it finds that urban concentration decreases with the total urban population, the importance of agriculture, the ratio of manufacturing employment to service employment, a federalized system of government, and literacy. w x Wheaton and Shishido 24 also measure urban concentration with a Herfindahl index; using a nonlinear model, they relate urban concentration to GNP per capita. They interpret their results as showing that Ž . optimal city population increases with development GNP per capita up to a middle level of development and subsequently falls. Wheaton and Shishido's implied optimal city size is much larger than that found in most developing countries. Presumably, they would not claim that developingcountry urbanization is excessive. w x A recent paper by Ades and Glaeser 1 emphasizes the role of government and politics in determining the population of the largest city in a country. In their model, government uses spatial tax policy to survive while exploiting the population. The model assumes that favorable treatment of the largest city enhances the government's survival. It implies that dictatorship increases the desired population of the largest city and that political instability increases it, especially for democracies. In their empirical model of the determinants of the size of a nation's largest city, Ades and Glaeser use measures of dictatorship and of political instability and also such variables as a capital-city dummy, nonurbanized population, land area, the share of the labor force outside agriculture, and the share of trade in GDP. One of these variables, the trade variable, has a statistically significant coefficient with the expected negative sign. The other variables have statistically significant coefficients with the expected positive signs. Another variable, GDP per capita, has a positive but insignificant coefficient.
In an equation that they do not discuss in detail, Ades and Glaeser find that both population share of the largest city and urbanization outside the main city have negative and significant effects on growth of GDP per w x capita. Moomaw and Shatter 16 also find that the population share of the largest city retards growth; a crucial difference, however, is that they find that concentration of the urban population in large cities, ceteris paribus, enhances growth. Thus, Moomaw and Shatter's results do not completely w x support the Ades and Glaeser 1, p. 14 conclusion that ''Large cities generate rent-seeking and instability, not long term economic growth.'' This paper provides evidence regarding the determinants of three aspects of urbanization. First, it estimates the determinants of the urban percentage with a Mills᎐Becker-type model as a benchmark against which the determinants of metropolitan concentration, defined as the percentage of the urban population in cities of 100,000 q population, are compared. It also estimates the determinants of urban primacy defined as the share of the urbanized population in the largest city.
This study extends the existing literature in several ways. First, depending upon the availability of the urbanization data, it uses 68, 74, or 90 countries for the years 1960, 1970, and 1980. Thus, it includes more Ž w x w x countries than other studies Henderson 10 , Rosen and Resnick 18 , w x. Wheaton and Shishido 24 that focus on urban concentration and uses 3 w x years of cross-sectional data. Ades and Glaeser 1 use more countries than Ž . Ž our study 85 compared to 74 and use data from more years four years . compared to three . They, however, average the data over time; thus their study is pure cross-sectional, whereas we use a panel data set. We use Ž . ordinary least squares OLS to estimate equations that include dummy variables for regions of the world and for time; such estimates provide information regarding ''overurbanization'' and possibly about changing temporal patterns of urbanization. We also use panel estimation techniques in an attempt to extract more information from the data. We present estimates based on the within estimatorᎏa dummy variable for each country. Because we have only three cross-sections in the panel, we believe that the pooled OLS estimates with regional and time dummies yield the preferred results.
This study examines urbanization and development across countries. By distinguishing between the urban percentage, metropolitan concentration, and primacy, it allows a variable, say export orientation, to have different effects on different aspects of urbanization. It finds, for instance, that the relative importance of exports increases the urban percentage but reduces both metropolitan concentration and primacy. These important results Ž provide empirical support for recent theories of urbanization e.g., w x. Elizondo and Krugman 6 . The study also shows that the importance of agriculture and industry affects the urban percentage and metropolitan concentration in expected ways, but that it does not affect primacy. Perhaps this means that the urbanization and metropolitan concentration are more responsive to economic forces than is primacy, implying that primacy may be more responsive to political forces. In short, the paper studies the determinants of various aspects of urbanization, whereas most papers study only one aspect, usually some element of primacy or of the urban percentage.
The paper next discusses general hypotheses regarding urbanization and the variables used to represent them. Subsequently, it presents the estimates of the determinants of the urban percentage, metropolitan concentration, and urban primacy.
AN OVERVIEW OF URBANIZATION
This section discusses the ideas behind and variables used in the equations estimated in the next two sections. A fundamental idea is that economic development increases market size, which in turn results in increased division and specialization of labor. Other important ideas relate to urban economic theory, changing demand patterns with development, and development indicators other than per capita production. GDP per capita and the shares of agriculture and industry in the aggregate economy are the overall development indicators. Other variables considered are literacy, commodity exports as a share of GDP, and foreign assistance as a share of GDP.
As economies develop, the division and specialization of labor increase Ž w x w x. in response to the size of the market Evans 7 and Stigler 20 . Increased reliance on external sources for inputs and for the distribution of outputs replaces reliance on the subsistence farm, the village market, and the company town. Greater specialization and trade ensues, placing a premium on proximity. Economizing on transportation and communication leads to urbanization. Thus, economic development, holding constant the distribution of economic activity across agriculture, industry, and services, may lead to increased urbanizationᎏa greater share of economic activity in cities.
Changes in demand patterns that accompany development increase the Ž importance of services and manufactured goods see, e.g., Graves and w x w x. Sexton 8 and Mills and Becker 12 . With the shift toward services and manufacturing goods, cost advantages due to agglomeration economies favor cities. The ''primary agglomeration benefits of a city are captured by Ž . manufacturing industries, less so in services and of course agriculture '' Ž w x . Graves and Sexton 8, p. 161 . Thus, demand and cost changes associated with increases in per capita income may also lead to greater industrialization and urbanization.
In short, economic development may lead to greater urbanization for two reasons. First, the increased division of labor associated with larger markets makes economizing on communication and transportation costs more important. This in turn implies an increasing advantage for urban location. Second, a likely shift in economic structure away from agriculture Ž . often associated with development may lead to greater urbanization. Changes in economic structure and the level of economic development can be independent. Thus, an empirical model should include variables to test Ž the independent effects of economic development measured by per capita . Ž production and sectoral structure measured by shares of economic activ-. ity in agriculture, industry, and services .
An increased literacy rate also accompanies economic development. Does it also have an independent effect on urbanization? A presumption exists that an increased level of education leads to greater urbanization. If this is a direct, positive, independent determinant of urbanization, it might imply that education alters preferences to make urban areas more attracw x tive. Henderson 10 , however, argues that the literacy rate reflects the technological sophistication of the economy. Therefore, he expects a positive but indirect association of the literacy rate with urbanization because literacy is a proxy for the type of technology that leads firms to urban areas. w x Mills and Song 14 suggest that the unexpectedly high level of urbanization in South Korea might be due to the openness of the Korean economy. Openness might lead to urbanization for two reasons. First, it may increase the importance of transportation nodes, which are present mostly in urban areas. Second, it may increase demand for marketing, financing, and communicationᎏface-to-face contactᎏmaking an urban location more w x important. Elizondo and Krugman 6 , on the other hand, expect increased trade to decrease the importance of large cities and more particularly the largest city. They argue that in a small, closed economy, backward and forward linkages combined with economies of scale cause production to be concentrated in a single city. Economies of scale dictate that most industrial products will be produced at a single location, and backward and forward linkages to customers and suppliers dictate production at the same, single location. Therefore, excessive urban size or primacy develops. The process is reversed with greater openness because industrial firms buy and sell in international markets, releasing them from the same, single location. Therefore, openness reduces the size of large cities.
Because foreign aid may be allocated in response to political as well as economic considerations, we use it to test for a political bias toward urbanization. If developing countries wish to promote urbanization, foreign aid provides a potential instrument.
These considerations lead to the use of the following variables in the regression models of the next section. The models take the percent urban Ž . Ž . Ž . as a log linear function of: i GDP per capita GDPrCAP , ii the Ž .Ž . percentage of the labor force in agriculture AGRrLAB , iii the percent-Ž . Ž . age of the labor force in industry INDrLAB , iv the literacy rate for Ž . Ž . those 15 years and older LITR , v commodity exports as a proportion of Ž . Ž . GDP EXPrGDP , and vi foreign assistance as a proportion of GDP Ž . ASSISTrGDP .
EMPIRICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE URBAN PERCENTAGE
Economic development, as measured by income per capita, has a strong association with urbanization, as measured by the urban percentage. For example, a simple regression of the log of the urban percentage on the log of GDP per capita for 90 countries for 1980 yields a coefficient of 0.49 and an R 2 of 0.71. In this section, we test for multiple determinants of the urban percentage using log-linear models and a panel data set that Ž . 2 includes 90 countries and three years 1960, 1970, and 1980 .
The first equation in Table 1 shows pure cross-section results using 1980 data. 3 In this multiple regression the coefficient of GDPrCAP is 0.32, compared to 0.49 in the simple regression. The coefficients of AGRrLAB and INDrLAB have the expected signs and are significant. The level of economic development and the sectoral distribution of production exert significant, independent effects on urbanization.
The coefficients of AGRrLAB and INDrLAB support Sexton and Graves's hypothesis regarding the relative attraction that urban areas have for industry, agriculture, and services. An increase in INDrLAB, holding AGRrLAB constant, is at the expense of the residual sector, which we call services. Therefore, the positive and significant coefficient of INDrLAB is consistent with the Graves and Sexton conjecture; it implies that an increase in industry's share at the expense of the residualᎏservicesᎏin-creases urbanization. Similarly, the negative and significant coefficient of AGRrLAB implies that a substitution of agriculture for services reduces urbanization.
EXPrGDP has a positive effect on the urban percentage. Other things equal, more open economies are more urbanized.
Ž . The other significant coefficient in Eq. 1 is for ASSISTrGDP, foreign assistance as a proportion of GDP. 4 The positive coefficient suggests that foreign assistance has promoted urbanization, independent of its effect on development or industrialization. It may suggest a political bias toward urbanization. Such a bias has long been suspected. In the early 1970s an OECD report said that foreign assistance ''was instrument in favouring the w x . towns'' 17, p. 204 . To the best of our knowledge, however, our study is 2 See the Appendix for details about the data. 3 Estimates using only 1980 data are reported for two reasons. One, data for ASSISTrGDP were unavailable for 1960; because we were particularly interested in this variable we estimated equations using the available data. Two, we want to compare the pooled results with the results for 1980, a year for which the data may be more accurate than those for earlier years. a The number in parentheses is the t statistic. The number above it is the coefficient.
*Significance at 90%. **Significance at 95%. ***Significance at 99%. the first to find a statistical association between foreign assistance and urbanization.
To provide additional evidence for the relationship between urbanization and development, we pooled data for 1960, 1970, and 1980 . Data are available for all three years for all variables except ASSISTrGDP. Information is available, however, that allows the construction of a dummy variable, DASSIST, which takes the value of one if a country is a recipient of foreign assistance. Compared to the dummy variable, the continuous variable, ASSISTrGDP, has the advantage of measuring the extent of foreign assistance. To decide if ASSISTrGDP and DASSIST measure the same thing, we run otherwise identical regressions with one variable, then Ž . Ž . the other. Equation 2 contains the same variables and data as Eq. 1 , except that DASSIST replaces ASSISTrGDP. The coefficient of DASSIST is significant and positive in the second regression, just as the coefficient of ASSISTrGDP is in the first. Just as importantly, the other coefficients remain essentially unchanged. Ž . attains increased significance. In Eq. 3 all coefficients are significant except for that of D80. The results conform with expectations regarding the effects of economic development on urbanization. In addition, the coefficient on the foreign assistance variable supports the assertion that political factors in developing countries may lead to a bias toward urbanization.
Ž . The coefficients of the dummy variables for 1970 and 1980 in Eq. 3 and subsequent regressions imply that the urban percentage function either was lower or unchanged vis-a-vis 1960. In particular, there is nò evidence of an upward drift of the function, a drift feared by some.
Ž . Ž . Equation 4 augments Eq. 3 by adding dummy variables for separate geographic regions of the world to capture regional effects. Several noticeable changes emerge. First, the coefficient of GDPrCAP is smaller. Second, the coefficient of LITR is substantially larger. Third, the coefficient of DASSIST, the foreign assistance variable, becomes insignificant. ŽIn a regression not reported here using 1970 and 1980 data and replacing 
Ž . Next we report the results for Eq. 5 , the specification with country fixed effects. This equation is estimated using the within, or dummy variable, estimator. 6 Three variables retain significant coefficients ᎏAGRrLAB, INDrLAB, and LITRᎏthus economic structure and education have robust effects. Although the coefficients of GDPrCAP and EXPrCAP are not significant in this model, the earlier estimates with significant coefficients for all these variables are preferred because of the lack of sufficient time-series data for each country.
The results for the urban percentage model in Table 1 are generally consistent with expectations and with previous research. GDP per capita, the share of economic activity in agriculture, services and industry, and literacy have the expected effects on the urban percentage. We also find Ž . we believe for the first time a positive effect of export orientation on the urban percentage. Furthermore, some estimates support the conjecture that foreign aid may be biased toward urban areas. Finally, the fixed effects for some regions that include developing countries have positive coefficients. This says that urbanization is greater in these regionsᎏper-haps because of political factorsᎏthan would be predicted based on European data; this may be Bairoch's ''urbanization without development.'' With these results as a benchmark, the paper now turns to the main question: Does economic development bias urbanization toward large cities?
DETERMINANTS OF METROPOLITAN CONCENTRATION
Two measures of a bias toward large cities are relevant. One is metropolitan concentration, which we define as the share of a country's urbanized population in cities of greater than 100,000 population. The other is primacy, which we define as the largest city's share of a country's urbanized population.
7 First we deal with metropolitan concentration, then primacy.
Ž . Metropolitan concentration MrU is equivalent to the metropolitan Ž . share of the national population MrN divided by the urban share of the Ž . national population UrN , where M, U, and N are metropolitan, urban, and national population, respectively. The log of metropolitan concentration, therefore, is equivalent to the log of the metropolitan percentage minus the log of the urban percentage. We assume that the metropolitan percentage depends on the same variables as the urban percentage, so we use the specification of Table 1 for the metropolitan concentration equation. 8 If an explanatory variable has a positive coefficient, we say it ''biases'' urbanization toward larger cities. 9 This section considers whether metropolitan concentration increases with economic development. Before discussing the multiple regressions, we note that the simple regression of the log of metropolitan concentration on the log of GDPrCAP yields a coefficient of 0.07 with a t statistic of 2.06; R 2 is 0.06. This suggests that economic development measured by produc-7 Ž w x. We decided not to use the exponent of the Pareto distribution Rosen and Resnick 18 Ž w x. and the Herfindahl index Henderson 10 because we wanted to distinguish between population concentration in large cities and population concentration in the primate city. The former measures do not allow for this distinction. Furthermore, we consider the concentration of the urbanized population in large cities and in the primate city because we want to test whether economic development biases population toward large cities and the primate city relative to smaller urban places. To do this, we have to accept the different definitions of urban places used by different countries. tion per capita is associated with a greater concentration of urban population in metropolitan areasᎏa bias toward big cities. The relationship, however, is much weaker than the association between the urban percentage and development.
Does the bias toward large cities persist in the multiple regressions? The results in Table 2 suggest that the percentages of the labor force in agriculture, industry, and services have significant effects on metropolitan concentration. In particular, an increase in AGRrLAB, holding INDrLAB constant, pulls population to rural areas and smaller urban areas. This w x result conforms with Henderson's 10 work. An increase in INDrLAB, at Ž . the expense of services holding AGRrLAB constant , increases metropolitan concentration in contrast to Henderson's result that an increase in the manufacturing᎐services ratio reduces urban concentration. In general, these results are consistent with the position that metropolitan concentration is determined by the interaction of demand and cost. Note, however, that the result for AGRrLAB holds for the country-fixed-effects Ž . equation, Eq. 10 , but that the result for INDrLAB does not.
An increase in the relative importance of exports reduces metropolitan concentration in all of the equations. The result is consistent with w x Elizondo and Krugman's 6 arguments regarding the lesser importance of large cities in more open economies. It is also an empirical result consisw x tent with, but stronger than, that of Ades and Glaeser 1 for a similar variable. Results for this variable from the two sets of equations show that Ž . Ž . a greater export orientation i increases the urban percentage and ii reduces metropolitan concentration. Trade increases urbanization, but its effect is biased toward small rather than large cities.
The variable for foreign assistance has a positive coefficient, which is Ž . Ž . Ž . significant at a 0.10 level, in Eqs. 6 and 8 . Equation 6 uses DASSIST Ž . and 1980 data, whereas Eq. 8 uses ASSISTrGDP and pools data for 1970 and 1980. This would imply that foreign assistance has a bias toward large cities relative to all urban places. But the coefficient of DASSIST is not Ž . Ž . Ž . significant in a Eq. 7 with pooled 1970 and 1980 data, b an equation Ž . Ž . Ž . with pooled data for the three years results not reported , or c Eq. 9 with pooled data and regional fixed effects. 10 The variable is omitted from Ž . Eq. 10 , the equation with country fixed effects.
The development indicator, GDPrCAP, and the literacy rate, LITR, do not have significant coefficients in any of the equations in Table 2 . Economic development per se is neutral with respect to metropolitan concentration. 10 w x In Shatter 19 the continuous variable and the dummy variable for foreign assistance are used in equations with regional fixed effects. In these equations, the foreign assistance is never significant. a The number in parentheses is the t statistic. The number above it is the coefficient.
*Significance at 90%. **Significance at 95%. ***Significance at 99%.
The coefficients for the dummy variables for 1970 and 1980 in Table 2 Ž . are usually significant but of opposite sign. Furthermore, in Eq. 10 the coefficient of D70 changes from positive in the earlier equation to negative and that of D80 changes in the opposite direction. The results for the time dummies are suspect because the metropolitan data for 1970 were pro-Ž w x. jected Davis and Golden 5 and the metropolitan data for 1980 were Ž w x. from a different source United Nations 22 than the 1960 and 1970 data.
Ž . Equation 9 includes fixed effects for geographic regions. Three of the six regions with positive coefficients for the dummy variablesᎏSouth America, the Middle East, and Southern Africaᎏcontain many developing countries. This could be taken as support for Bairoch's concept of urbanization without development, particularly considering that two of these regions were ''overurbanized'' in the urban-percentage results. But four other regions with developing countries do not show such an effect.
Three regionsᎏOceania, North America, and Southeast Asiaᎏconsist-ing entirely or partially of more-developed countries also have positive fixed effects. The fixed effects for these regions might have a technological explanation. Much of the original development of large cities in North America and Oceania occurred under different technology than did those of Europe. Southeast Asia, with its much more recent economic development, also has much urbanization under different conditions than other regions. Europe, on the other hand, has had its urban systems in place for a long time. Perhaps what seems to be urbanization without development is really appropriate urbanization under modern technological conditions.
We tentatively conclude that metropolitan concentration does not depend on economic development per se, although the results for agriculture and industry suggest a dependence on economic structure. To the extent that economic development is intrinsically associated with reductions in agriculture and increases in industry, however, it does lead to metropolitan concentration. Conversely, countries in which exports are more important have lower levels of metropolitan concentration than they otherwise would. Finally, there is an indication that ''newer'' regions have greater metropolitan concentration, an effect perhaps due to technology.
DETERMINANTS OF URBAN PRIMACY
The specification of the urban primacy equation differs from that of previous models. We add three variables based on suggestions in the w x literature. Mills and Hamilton 13 state that ''As a rule, large countries tend to be less primate than small countries . . . and high-income countries Ž . tend to be less primate than low-income countries'' p. 411 . To control the size effect, which may also control the arbitrariness of national boundaries, we add the log of the national population, POP, as an independent w x variable. Henderson 10 To capture these effects on primacy we include the dummy variable DCENTR, which takes the value of one for a unitary national government. 11 We also add DCAPCTY, which takes the value of one if a country's largest w x city is also its national capital. Ades and Glaeser 1 use the latter, but not the former, variable to capture political effects.
We removed the foreign assistance variable from the primacy equation Ž w x. because its coefficient was never significant see Shatter 19 . Although AGRrLAB and INDrLAB also had insignificant coefficients in that preliminary study, we report equations that include these variables because Ades and Glaeser use one of them, percent agriculture, in their estimates. Consequently, in Table 3 we report results for four sets of equations with Ž . the following attributes: the set that includes a GDPrCAP, AGRrLAB, Only the estimates that pool the observations for different periods are reported and discussed. Primacy is measured as the population of the largest city as a proportion of total urban population. GDPrCAP has a negative coefficient in the six equations in which it appears; the t ratios range from 1.01 to 4.17. The coefficients of GDPrCAP are significant only in the equations that exclude both AGRrLAB and INDrLAB, suggesting troublesome collinearity among the variables. In addition, the coefficients for POP and EXPrGDP are negative and significant in all equations in Table 3 , while the coefficients of LITR are positive and significant.
So primacy is greater in countries with lower GDPrCAP. But why? Is it because of economic forces or some combination of cultural, political, and social forces? We argue that economic forces are extremely important, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The theoretical argument adw x vanced by Elizondo and Krugman 6 derives from Adam Smith's famous theorem that ''the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.'' 11 w x We followed Mutlu 15 in classifying governments as unitary or federal.
Žw
. Indeed, Stigler 20, p. 139 states that w x .
. . geographic dispersion is a luxury that can be afforded by industries countries?
Ž only after they ha¨e grown large so that e¨en the smaller production centers can reap . w x the major gains of specialization . . . . my question As relatively small production centers become large enough to gain some advantages of specialization, transportation costs dictate geographic dispersion of production. With the increase in the extent of the market, relatively small centers become more importantᎏlargerᎏat the expense of the largest cities. This geographic dispersion is exactly what the coefficients of GDPrCAP, POP, and EXPrGDP imply. An increase in GDPrCAP, holding POP and the other variables constant, means that the economy is larger, allowing the advantages of specialization to be reaped, even if production is dispersed. An increase in population, holding GDPrCAP constant, also implies a larger economy. The coefficients of POP is negative and significant in all equations, implying that a larger economy has less primacy. Similarly, the coefficients for EXPrGDP are negative and significant in all equations. As predicted directly by Elizondo and Krugman and indirectly by Smith and Stigler, as the ''extent of the market'' increases with EXPrGDP, primacy declinesᎏdispersion increases.
Although the coefficients of GDPrCAP and POP are quite similar in the equation with and without regional fixed effects, the coefficient of the export variable is stronger in those with regional effects. The regional fixed effects themselves suggest greater primacy in countries classified in Central America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. The countries classified in South America and West Africa have positive coefficients for the regional fixed effects that just miss significance. These results may support an independent political or underdevelopment bias toward primacy.
We do not completely ignore political variables. The dummy variable for Ž . a country whose national capital is its largest city DCAPCTY has significant coefficients, with the expected sign, in all equations. But the dummy variable for the unitary national government, DCENTR, has insignificant coefficients in all equations.
The results for economic structure suggest that it does not play a role in primacy. First, the coefficient of INDrLAB is never significant. Second, AGRrLAB has significant but positive coefficients in the equations without the regional fixed effects. This result may be consistent with Bairoch's w x 2 argument that the density of agricultural population pushes people to cities, particularly to large cities. But third, the coefficients of AGRrLAB are not significant in the estimates with the regional fixed effects.
Although the coefficients of LITR are smaller and less significant in the equations with regional fixed effects, literacy rates are associated positively with more primacy. This might be the ''bright lights'' effect differentially attracting more educated people to the largest city. Or it might be, as Henderson argues, that greater literacy is associated with more advanced technologies. Thus, the more advanced technologies could be responsible for the concentration in the largest city.
The coefficients of the dummy variables for 1970 and 1980 are consistent across the eight equations. The coefficients for 1970 are not significant, but the coefficients for 1980 are positive and significant, suggesting that the primacy function shifted up from its 1960 level by 1980. So, if primacy is a problem, the problem may be getting worse. Table 4 shows the results of estimating these equations with country fixed effects, time effects, and the various combinations of the continuous variables. As in the previous section, the results are not as strong in these equations as in the equations without country fixed effects. With the a The number of parentheses in the t statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. b To increase the number of observations, we used an unbalanced panel for the regressions reported in Table 3 and 4. *Significance at 90%. **Significance at 95%. ***Significance at 99%. exception of the coefficient for the 1980 dummy in one of the four equations, the only significant coefficients are for EXPrGDP and for Ž LITR. This specification embeds political effects, such as the effect of . DCAPCTY, in the country fixed effects.
Given the shortness of time-series data, we believe that the estimates in Table 3 are the preferred ones. These results imply that economic influences, particularly ''the extent of the market,'' are powerful determinants of primacy. These influences are captured by the coefficients on EXPrGDP, GDPrCAP, and POP. Todaro's observation that primacy is a Ž . feature of low-income ''developing'' countries is supported by these results. The results also suggest that this feature is an appropriate geographical adaption to economic conditions. Nevertheless, political factors may be important, as suggested by the strength of the capital city variable and perhaps by the regional fixed effects.
CONCLUSION
This study has used panel data to estimate the determinants of the urban percentage, metropolitan concentration, and primacy. Many urban economists see economic forces as the determinants of these different dimensions of urbanizationᎏin both developed and developing countries. Other economists, including Bairoch and Todaro, believe that the urban percentage and primacy in developing countries greatly exceed optimal levels. Excessive urbanization results, they believe, from political forces, inefficient migration, and dual industrial and rural sectors. Indeed, Bairoch describes the situation as urbanization without development, meaning that developing countries today are more urbanized than other countries were at similar levels of development in the last century.
With respect to the percentage of the national population in urban areas ᎏthe urban percentageᎏwe find that countries with smaller shares of their labor force in agriculture and larger shares in industry are more urbanized. Countries with higher literacy rates are also more urbanized. In addition, in all specifications save oneᎏthat with country fixed effectsᎏwe find that urbanization increases with GDP per capita and with exports as a proportion of GDP. When regional fixed effects are included, five regions that contain less-developed countries have greater urbanization than expected compared with Western Europe, the base region. Three other regions that contain less-developed countries, however, do not have significantly different urban percentages vis-a-vis Europe. As Bairoch says, urbanization is greater today, other things equal, then it was in the 19th century. Given that the urban percentage responds as expected to development and given the tremendous changes in communication and transportation technologies over the past century, we do not conclude, however, that the urban percentage is in some sense too great.
Metropolitan concentration also responds to economic forces. The most striking result, perhaps, is the negative relationship between the export share of GDP and metropolitan concentration. Furthermore, metropolitan concentration decreases with agriculture's share and increases with indus-Ž . try's share except in the specification with country fixed effects of the labor force. Literacy and production per capita do not have significant effects. Regions consisting of both developed and less-developed countries have positive regional effects.
Finally, with regard to primacy, there is evidence that political forces are important. There is an apparent bias toward the capital city; furthermore, the pattern of significant regional fixed effects suggests political influences. Economics is also important. Primacy is greater, other things equal, the smaller the economy, the lower GDP per capita, the smaller the share of exports in GDP, and the lower the literacy rate. Primacy is associated with a lower level of development, but this may be in response to economic forces. The sectoral distribution of the labor force does not appear to affect primacy. These results are subject to the qualification that the share of exports in GDP and the literacy rate have the only significant coefficients in the equation with country fixed effects.
APPENDIX
We attempted to collect data for 90 countries. We started with the 121 countries listed in the ''World Development Indicators'' in the ''1990 w x World Bank Report'' World Bank 25 . After eliminating city-states ᎏHong Kong and Singaporeᎏand other countries for which we could not get complete urbanization or economic data for 1960, 1970, and 1980, we grouped them into 11 regions. The 90 countries used in the urban percentage regressions are listed in Table A1 . The table also shows the countries used in the subsequent metropolitan concentration and urban primacy equations.
The urban percentage and the percentage of the urban population in the largest cityᎏprimacyᎏare from the ''World Development Indicators'' w x supplemented by ''Prospects of World Urbanization, 1988''' 23 . Metropolitan concentration, the percentage of the urbanized population in w x cities of 100,000 or more, was computed from data in Davis and Golden 5 w x and various issues of the U.N. ''Demographic Yearbook'' 22 . Population w x in cities of 100,000 or more are from Davis and Golden 5 for 1960 and Ž . 1970. They projected the 1970 population data. Population for cities of 100,000 or more for 1980 is from the ''Demographic Yearbook.'' We identified metropolitan areas or agglomerations of 100,000 q population and summed their populations to get metropolitan population. Unfortunately, we were unable to construct this variable for the original 90 countries; it is available for only 68 countries. The urban percentages uses each country's definition of an urban place; the size criterion for designating an urban place differs from country to country. Regional and country fixed effects will pick up some of this variation. In collecting data for the metropolitan population and the population of the largest city, we used, to the extent possible, metropolitan-area designations rather than the city proper. GDP per capita is adjusted for purchasing power; we thank Robert w x Barro 3 for providing it. Labor shares, literacy rates, population, and the export share of GDP came from the ''World Development Indicators'' of the World Bank. Information on central or unitary form of government w x came from Mutlu 15 . 
